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Don’t Shoot the Messenger!
A Discussion of ISP Liability 
Andrew Bernstein† and Rima Ramchandani‡
Introduction Online Defamation — Liability for
Publication of Defamatory Words 
n today’s world of rampant networked communica-I tion, the Internet Service Provider (‘‘ISP’’) finds itself in
United States a uniquely vulnerable position. As the conduit through
which content is disseminated to a numerically and geo-
graphically vast audience, the obvious legal risk to ISPs is Legislation 
that those who provide content will do so in a way that
attracts legal liability. Like many communications prov- n the U.S., ISPs are effectively immunized from lia-
iders (such as publishers or broadcasters), the ISP may I bility for defamation by third parties by the operation
have to assume some responsibility for simply providing of section 230 of the Communications Decency Act
the means of transmitting content. In some cases, the ISP (‘‘CDA’’). 1 As its name suggests, the CDA aims at main-
is more actively involved in the transmission or is know- taining standards of decency in cyberspace while encour-
ingly complicit, and the argument for imposing liability aging the development and accessibility of new technol-
may be even stronger. The digital environment itself also ogies. Further to this goal, the CDA contains a ‘‘Good
raises novel concerns. The ISP makes a very attractive Samaritan’’ provision stating that providers of interactive
defendant because it is more readily identifiable in the computer service (which includes ISPs) are not to be
realm of cyberspace where user anonymity is often the treated as publishers or speakers of information provided
norm, because of the jurisdictional problems that arise by a third party. The original rationale for this protection
from the global nature of the Internet, and because the was to encourage ISPs to develop policies of monitoring
ISP may have deep pockets. Sometimes the ISP is caught and removing offensive content from their servers
in the middle of a dispute between a plaintiff and a without fear of being penalized for taking on an editorial
pseudonymous defendant, where the ISP is the only legal role and inviting the liability imposed on ‘‘publishers’’
entity with any information as to the defendant’s true under the law of defamation. Commentators have noted
identity. The dilemma of the ISP and the legal implica- that while the CDA was enacted to promote decency on
tions of the role it plays in the networked environment is the Internet and encourage self-regulation of ISPs, the
a highly contentious and currently unresolved area in breadth of the Good Samaritan provision has effectively
Canadian law. Given the pervasiveness of online com- created a blanket shield from liability for all ISPs, even
munication, however, it is expected that both the Cana- those that do not monitor their sites. 2 Cases decided
dian courts and the legislature will soon be forced to before the implementation of the CDA are still cited in
address this issue. the U.S. as courts struggle with the scope of section 230.
Moreover, pre-CDA cases may provide assistance toThis paper will attempt to describe some potentially
Canadian courts where no such legislation exists or istroublesome areas for ISPs, and give some suggestions as
likely to be enacted.to how liability can be minimized or avoided. The first
part is a discussion of defamation issues, the second part
Caselaw is a discussion of copyright and other intellectual prop-
erty rights, and the third part addresses the question of In Cubby v. Compuserve, 3 the District Court of
liability to subscribers over anonymity issues. We con- New York granted the defendant ISP’s motion for sum-
clude with some contracting tips for ISPs which bolster mary judgement in a defamation action. The ISP Com-
ISPs’ protection beyond the legal regime that is currently puserve gave its users access to various forums, one of
in place. which included a newsletter, Rumorville, containing
†Andrew Bernstein is a lawyer in Torys litigation department in Toronto, and a member of Torys’ technology group. He will be pursuing his LL.M. at
University of California (Berkeley) in 2002-2003.































































78 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
allegedly defamatory statements about the plaintiff. liability. However, the Court rejected this argument and
Compuserve had a contractual relationship with the cre- found that once the ISP received notice of a potentially
ator of the forum but had no independent contract with defamatory posting, it was thrust into the role of a tradi-
the creator of Rumorville. Moreover, Compuserve had tional publisher and section 230 prohibited treating the
no opportunity to review the contents of the newsletter ISP as a publisher.
before it was uploaded, it did not compensate the creator
Following Zeran, section 230 has gained consider-of Rumorville for the newsletter and it did not receive
able force in shielding ISPs from liability. In Blumenthalany fees for access to the newsletter (over and above the v. Drudge and AOL,7 AOL escaped liability for defama-general subscription fees charged to all users for access to
tory statements made on an online gossip column calledall services). Before the action was filed, Compuserve was
the Drudge Report. Even though AOL had paid thegiven no notice of the allegedly defamatory statements.
author of the report for the right to link to his columnThe Court held that Compuserve was essentially an elec-
and received advance notice of the content of the report,tronic library that had little or no editorial control over
the Court held that section 230 protected it from lia-the contents of these online publications. Compuserve
bility. According to the Court, through section 230, Con-was a distributor, not a publisher, and could not be held
gress opted not to hold ISPs liable for their failure to edit,liable for distributor liability because it had no knowl-
withhold or restrict access to offensive material throughedge of the defamatory content. The Court stated:
their services. Although AOL was not a passive conduit
A computerized database is the functional equivalent of like a telephone company, the CDA reflected a legislative
a more traditional news vendor, and the inconsistent appli- policy choice to provide immunity even when ISPs tookcation of a lower standard of liability to an electronic news
an aggressive role in making available content provideddistributor such as Compuserve than that which is applied
to a public library, book store or news-stand would impose by others. While the Court acknowledged that AOL had
an undue burden on the free flow of information . . . the taken advantage of the benefits of the CDA without
appropriate standard of liability to be applied to Com- accepting the burdens of monitoring content, the statu-puserve is whether it knew or had reason to know of the
tory language was clear and AOL was immune from theallegedly defamatory Rumorville statements. 4
suit. 8
By contrast, a few years later in Stratton Oakmont v.
Before the CDA, then, a defamation claim againstProdigy, 5 the New York Supreme Court found that the
an ISP for third party content was focused on the extentdefendant ISP was a publisher and granted the plaintiff’s
to which the ISP assumed an editorial function. Themotion for summary judgement against the ISP. Stratton
enactment of section 230 of the CDA has made thisinvolved the anonymous posting of defamatory state-
inquiry moot and it appears that all ISPs will be immunements on a bulletin board accessed through Prodigy.
from liability regardless of the editorial responsibilityThe critical issue was whether Prodigy exercised suffi-
they undertake. However, section 230 has its limits.cient editorial control over its bulletin boards to render
Recently, in Gucci America v. Hall & Associates, 9 theit a publisher with the same responsibilities as a news-
defendant ISP was unsuccessful in escaping liability onpaper for filtering content. Prodigy had created an edito-
the basis of section 230 after it was notified that one ofrial staff of Board Leaders who were responsible for
its subscribers was infringing the plaintiff’s trademarks.monitoring and censoring bulletin boards according to a
The Court looked to the plain language of the CDA andset of company guidelines, it had a system of automatic
held that it was required to interpret section 230 in ascreening in place and it held itself out to the public as
manner that would neither limit nor expand any intel-controlling the content of its bulletin boards. As such,
lectual property laws. Since this was a case of trademarkthe Court had little difficulty concluding that Prodigy
infringement, section 230 did not immunize the ISPhad brought itself within the definition of a publisher,
from liability. Despite the breadth of section 230, then, itand was therefore liable.
appears that the U.S. courts will likely only apply it toIn response to Stratton, Congress enacted the CDA. protect ISPs in claims of online defamation.Section 230 has now become a powerful shield from
liability for ISPs. Like Stratton, Zeran v. America Online6 A final U.S. case worth noting, in which the editorial
involved anonymous postings of defamatory statements role of the ISP was the controlling factor, was Lunney v.
on an AOL bulletin board. Upon notification by the Prodigy. 10 Although decided after the CDA, the Court in
plaintiff, AOL removed the original postings but more Lunney relied on common law principles in excusing
anonymous postings appeared which were not removed. Prodigy from liability. Lunney also involved the anony-
The Court found that section 230 of the CDA created mous postings of defamatory messages on a Prodigy bul-
federal immunity to any cause of action (not simply letin board. Upon becoming aware of the situation,
claims of defamation) that would make service providers Prodigy removed the offensive postings and closed the
liable for information originating with a third party user accounts of the author. Contrary to the decision in Blu-
of the service. Since section 230 precluded courts from menthal, the Court likened Prodigy to a telephone com-
treating ISPs as publishers, AOL was protected from lia- pany, a mere conduit which is not expected to monitor
bility. The plaintiff argued that AOL was a distributor the content of its users’ conversations. This was a reason-






























































A Discussion of ISP Liability 79
tractual relationship with the author of the defamatory postings, it is possible the Court may have found that it
statements whereas here, Prodigy had simply provided could rely on the innocent dissemination defence. How-
the forum in which the contents were posted. It fol- ever, given the Court’s definition of ‘‘publishing’’, this is
lowed, then, that Prodigy was not a publisher and could not certain.
not be held liable. The Court did not go on to consider
the potential for distributor liability, presumably because
Prodigy removed the postings upon notification of their Canada 
content. ISPs may therefore be protected from liability at
As we indicated, to our knowledge there have beencommon law as well as under section 230 of the CDA.
no reported Canadian decisions concerning the liability
of an ISP for Internet defamation. However, unless the
provincial legislatures legislate otherwise (or perhaps Par-United Kingdom 
liament, although it is far from certain that the federal
Caselaw from the U.K. will likely be of greater value government has sufficient constitutional jurisdiction to
to Canadian courts since the Canadian common law of legislate in this area), the safe assumption is that the
defamation tends to follow English rather than Amer- Canadian courts will likely follow some combination of
ican jurisprudence. In the U.K., the essential inquiry for the English and American (pre-Communications
ISP liability has been on whether an ISP can rely on the Decency Act) common law, and decide questions of lia-
defence of innocent dissemination. The defence would bility for defamation on the basis of some combination
immunize an ISP from liability if it could show (1) that it of the following factors:
is not the author, editor or publisher of the statement; (2)
(a) To what extent did the ISP merely provideit took reasonable care in relation to its publication; and
access, as opposed to content?(3) it did not know, or had reason to believe, that what it
did caused or contributed to the publication of the (b) Did the ISP purport to or actually exercise con-
defamatory statement. 11 trol over the defamatory content?
The Queen’s Bench considered this defence in God- (c) If it exercised control, did it attempt to screen
frey v. Demon Internet, 12 and arrived at a conclusion the contents for defamatory or other offensive
that would make ISPs much more vulnerable to liability content?
for third party content than in the U.S. The facts in
(d) Could the ISP reasonably have known about theGodfrey were very similar to those in Lunney, involving
offensive content?the anonymous postings of defamatory statements on a
newsgroup accessed through Demon Internet. However, (e) If it did not make any attempts to screen con-
unlike Prodigy, Demon Internet did not remove the tent in the ordinary course, or could not reason-
defamatory postings at the plaintiff’s request. The Court ably be expected to know about the content,
held that the transmission of a defamatory posting from was it notified?
the storage of a news server constituted ‘‘publication’’ of
(f) If it knew, or was notified, what steps did it take?that posting to any subscriber who accessed the new-
sgroup containing that posting. Moreover, the ISP could Although this is essentially a fair approach, in somenot claim it was an innocent disseminator because it ways these principles lead to the one slightly strangeknew of the defamatory posting and chose not to result that American legislators were attempting to avoidremove it. Although this was not particularly controver- by enacting section 230 of the CDA: an ISP that com-sial, what was surprising was the Court’s finding that pletely ignores the content on its network until someoneDemon Internet did not play a passive role because it complains is excused from liability, whereas the ‘‘Goodchose to receive and store the newsgroup postings and Samaritan’’ ISP that takes an active interest in the con-make them available to users. After reviewing the tent may be found liable. The natural consequence iscaselaw from the U.S., Morland J. concluded that the that ISPs will ignore the content on their networks, anddefendant Prodigy in Lunney would have been a pub- investigate only when someone complains. Ironically,lisher under U.K. law and would not have escaped lia- section 230 of the CDA does not help, and may evenbility. lead to a worse result: by excusing ISPs from liability
regardless of whether they review content, not only doesThe courts in the U.K., then, apply a much broader
the legislation give ISPs an incentive to ignore the con-concept of publication. It appears that an ISP need not
tent, but also to ignore any complaints, secure in thetake an active role of editing and/or monitoring in order
knowledge that they will not be liable in any event. Into invite the title — and responsibility — of publisher.
any event, unless similar legislation is introduced inSimply selecting and providing access to particular new-
Canada (or a province), ISPs should be very cautious ifsgroups, chat rooms and bulletin boards will be enough
they do decide to exert control over content, and actto attract liability in the U.K. Of course, had Demon
promptly upon receiving a complaint concerning defam-Internet taken swifter action and complied with the






























































80 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
more privacy protection than it had delivered byLiability Arising Out of Expectation
acceding to the subpoena, and that Yahoo! had negli-of Anonymity 
gently misrepresented its terms of service as it failed to
notify him prior to disclosing his identity. Although thisany users consider the Internet to be an anony-
suit was ultimately discontinued, it is a reminder to ISPsMmous forum. Most posters are able to use a pseu-
that they should make a clear statement in their terms ofdonym, if they are required to post any name at all.
use as to what their position will be when a subscriber’sOften, the only way to trace a user is by his or her
identity is sought by a third party, and then follow it inInternet Protocol (IP) address, a set of 4 numbers that is
every case.unique to each user at any given time. 13 These IP
addresses can be traced back to the ISP, who may be able
The Aquacool case also raises another importantto then identify its customer from the IP address and the
issue for ISPs: to what extent should they notify theirdate and time of the posting. 14 Hence, when defamatory
subscriber of the impending motion or application?or other objectionable statements are posted, it is often
While the ISP has no or little interest in maintainingthe case that the complaining party is only able to
anonymity, the user presumably does. However, it is theobtain, at most, the poster’s IP address. In those circum-
ISP, and not the user, who is served with the notice ofstances, the complaining party will then look to the ISP
motion or application. If it does not oppose the order,to provide identifying information.
the truly interested party (the poster) will not be able to
These requests create a tension for ISPs (as well as defend his or her anonymity until after it has already
other companies that provide access to and services on been lost. Hence, prudent practice suggests that the ISP
the Internet). To remain competitive, most ISPs must should advise the user of the pending proceeding, and
promise not to disclose information that would reveal pass along any materials that have been served. This
their users’ identities in their privacy policy or terms of enables the poster to retain counsel and attend on his or
use. Hence, they will rarely do so merely on request. In her behalf to argue for maintaining anonymity.
the civil context, this often results in the plaintiff Recently, Mr. Justice Spiegel  heard such a motion and
bringing a motion or application15 to compel the ISP to refused to grant the order requested at that time,
reveal the IP address and/or identity of the prospective adjourning the motion and ordering the Web site in
defendant. In the criminal context, there is no analogous question to serve the three pseudonymous posters with
mechanism, so typically the police will obtain a search the motion materials and notice of the return of the
warrant under the Criminal Code. motion. 16 If other judges follow this practice, it may very
well be that both the plaintiff and the ISP will want theThere are two issues that an ISP must consider
subscribers notified in advance of the return of thewhen it receives notice of a motion or application. First,
motion, to ensure that the matter can be resolved withthe ISP must decide whether to take a position, and if so,
only one court appearance.what it should be. Most ISPs do not have an interest in
maintaining the anonymity of their subscribers. Rather, One small variation to this scenario is the possibility
their interest is in maintaining a good business reputa- that, in very serious cases, the plaintiff will want to obtain
tion and minimizing the legal and administrative costs an Anton Pillar order to obtain the defendant’s (easilyassociated with these requests. ISPs that have a clause in destroyed) computer for evidentiary purposes on an extheir terms of use that state, for example, that they will parte basis. In those cases, ISPs are once again caughtnot reveal their users’ identities ‘‘except in accordance between the plaintiff (who has likely repeatedlywith a court order or other compulsory process’’ are in threatened the ISP with a lawsuit if they fail to coop-the best position, since they can take the position that erate) and the defendant (who is the ISP’s customer andthey will not participate in the proceeding, but if the who may sue if his or her identity is revealed withoutcourt issues an order, they will comply. notice). In those cases, it would seem that the salutary
practice would be to take affirmative pre-litigationISPs that have an affirmative promise to maintain
action, such as including a clause that the ISP has theprivacy without this exception are, potentially, in a more
contractual right to reveal the subscriber’s identitydifficult position. There is no doubt that they should
without notice, a good limitation of liability clause, andcomply with a court order, if obtained. However, having
perhaps even an arbitration clause, which tends to dis-made this promise to their users, they could easily be
courage frivolous lawsuits. However, once the litigationcriticized for failing to affirmatively oppose the motion
has been commenced, the ISP is likely within its rights toor application. In fact, in the United States, Yahoo! was
take the position that if the plaintiff wishes to keep thesued by an Internet poster who went by the pseudonym
order confidential, it is necessary for the judge to so‘‘Aquacool’’ for complying with what appeared to be a
order, and to seal the record under section 137 of thelegally valid subpoena. Aquacool’s complaints were,
Courts of Justice Act. In cases so extreme that an Antonessentially, that Yahoo! did not insist on the procedural
Pillar order is sought, it should not be that difficult toformalities that would ordinarily be applicable (essen-
obtain such an order, and it relieves the ISP of having totially personal service and acceptance by an in-state court






























































A Discussion of ISP Liability 81
the legislation will still be important in the U.S., and ofOnline Copyright Infringement 
particular relevance in Canada where no equivalent leg-
n the Internet era, copyright has gone from being an islation is in force or being seriously considered.I obscure area of the law, familiar to relatively few spe-
cialized practitioners and academics, to being a popular
Caselaw conversation topic. Type the word ‘‘copyright’’ into
Google (the search engine), and you will find approxi- One of the earlier, and oft-cited, cases of ISP liability
mately 139,000,000 hits in 0.05 seconds. The funda- for copyright infringement is Playboy Enterprises v.
mental change of the digital age has been the ability to Frena. 22 The defendant in Frena operated a bulletin
make unlimited copies of text, music, pictures, software board service (‘‘BBS’’) 23 through which one of his sub-
and anything else that can be expressed in machine scribers uploaded infringing copies of Playboy photos.
code. Moreover, this can be done essentially anony- Although the defendant immediately removed the
mously, and by millions of people at the same time. infringing material from his service upon being notified
Under these circumstances, it is only natural that those of the matter and began monitoring his service to pre-
with an interest in preserving the exclusivity that copy- vent additional infringement, the Court found the defen-
right provides (i.e., artists, writers, publishers, etc.) will dant liable for usurping the plaintiff’s right to publicly
look to the gatekeepers rather than the individual con- distribute and display its copyrighted work. According to
sumer in an attempt to limit the potential infringements the Court, the lack of intent or knowledge to infringe
facilitated by digital technology. In this section, we was not relevant in assessing liability and if anything, the
describe the American legislative regime, and in partic- innocence of the defendant would go to the issue of
ular the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, as well as damages.
some caselaw. We then compare this to the Canadian
The case was even stronger for imposing liability onlegislative framework which has not been specifically
an ISP in Sega Enterprises v. Maphia, 24 where the BBSamended to reflect some of the liability issues that may
operator solicited subscribers to download copyrightedarise. We conclude this section by discussing some pro-
Sega games onto its service and charged other sub-posed legislative changes.
scribers a fee to download the games for their personal
use. The Court easily found the defendant liable for
United States contributory infringement since it had played an active
role in the infringement, providing the facilities for cop-
Legislation ying, as well as directing and encouraging the copying.
In 1998, the U.S. ratified the WIPO treaties through Although the Court in Frena did not consider the
the enactment of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act lack of editorial control by the BBS operator a relevant
(‘‘DMCA’’). Under Title II of the DMCA, online service factor in assessing liability, this was the critical factor in
providers (such as ISPs) can avoid liability if one of its Religious Technology Center v. Netcom.25 Netcom gave
subscribers infringes copyright by following the notice its subscribers access to a BBS on which a user had made
and takedown provisions detailed in the Act. The DMCA a series of postings criticizing the Church of Scientology,
contains four ‘‘Safe Harbours’’ of conduct for ISPs: ISPs using the Church’s copyrighted materials. The BBS
can limit liability based on (1) transitory communica- would not remove the postings without proof of the
tion;17 (2) system caching; 18 (3) storage of information on plaintiff’s copyright (which the plaintiff was unwilling to
systems or networks at direction of user; 19 and (4) infor- give) and Netcom would not disable access to the post-
mation locations tools. 20 To avoid liability, an ISP must ings because it could not do so without cutting off all of
not have actual knowledge/awareness of facts indicating the other users of the BBS. The Court found that
that the material is infringing, the ISP must not receive Netcom did not create or control the content of the
any financial benefit directly attributable to the information available to its subscribers. The Court analo-
infringing activity, and upon receiving notification of a gized Netcom to the owner of a copying machine who
claimed infringement, the ISP must expeditiously take lets the public make copies but is not responsible for the
down and disable access to the material. 21 infringing activities of its customers. An ISP that acts as a
mere conduit would not be liable for direct infringe-In order to benefit from the limitations on liability
ment because the necessary element of volition or causa-in the DMCA, an ISP must designate an agent (with the
tion was lacking. Netcom was also not vicariously liableCopyright Office) to receive notices of infringing activity
because it did not receive any fees relating to theand must implement a policy of terminating the
infringement (aside from its fixed fee to all subscribersaccounts of subscribers who repeatedly infringe. In short,
for access to all services). However, the Court found thatthe DMCA encourages ISPs to be responsible and in
Netcom may be liable for contributory infringementreturn, an ISP is granted immunity from liability. Should
since it had knowledge of the infringing material andan ISP choose not to follow the DMCA provisions, a
ignored the request to remove the postings. The Courtcopyright owner retains the right to seek financial dam-
speculated that allowing public distribution of infringingages from the ISP for contributory or vicarious infringe-






























































82 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
constitute substantial participation in the infringement. above provisions would only apply to passive ISPs who
Although this was only a motion for summary judgment, do not authorize or actively engage in the infringing
the decision clearly indicates that an ISP may be liable as activity. Thus, an ISP could not escape liability by relying
a contributory infringer once it is made aware of the solely on its status as a communications provider and
infringement and neglects to rectify the problem.26 would attract liability should it play a greater role in the
infringement.Frena, Sega and Netcom were all decided before the
DMCA was passed. ISPs that abide by the notice and The potential scope and limits of paragraph 2.4(1)(b)
takedown provisions in the DMCA will now avoid lia- as applied to ISPs was recently considered by the Federal
bility for copyright infringement. The germane question Court of Appeal in the judicial review of the Copyright
is no longer how to deal with the changes in technology, Board’s decision in Tariff 22, styled SOCAN v. Canadian
but rather how to interpret the various provisions of the Association of Internet Providers et al. 32 Tariff 22 is a
statute. 27 royalty scheme proposed by Society of Composers,
Authors and Publishers of Canada (‘‘SOCAN’’) for the
Canada transmission of musical works over the Internet. Under
Tariff 22, the Copyright Board held that ISPs acting as
passive intermediaries when communicating musicalThe Current Legal Position 
works to the public by telecommunication will be savedAt this stage, it is not clear how Canadian courts will from liability by the common carrier exemption in para-address the issue of ISP liability for online copyright graph 2.4(1)(b) of the Copyright Act. ISPs cannot benefitinfringement. 28 Certainly, the courts in the U.S. have from the exemption, however, when they post content,much more extensively considered this issue, and associate with others that offer content, create imbeddedCanada will likely be influenced by many of the policy links, moderate newsgroups or engage in activities thatarguments that pervade those judgments. 29 However, extend beyond simply providing the means of commu-there are differences between the Canadian and U.S. nication. 33statutes, and, as the Supreme Court of Canada has
reminded us, Canadian courts should be wary of merely The Federal Court of Appeal upheld the Tariff 22
adopting the American approach. 30 decision in most respects. According to the Court, three
conditions must be met in order for paragraph 2.4(1)(b)Under Canada’s current copyright regime, ISPs are
to apply to an ISP: (i) its activities must amount to thepotentially vulnerable to liability for infringement of tel-
means of telecommunication; (ii) these means must beecommunication and reproduction rights. Subsection
necessary or enabling another person to communicate a3(1) of the Copyright Act states:
work to the public; and (iii) the activities in question3. (1) For the purposes of this Act, ‘‘copyright’’, in rela-
must constitute the ISP’s only act with respect to thetion to a work, means the sole right to produce or reproduce
the work or any substantial part thereof in any material communication. 34 Although the Court recognized that
form whatever . . . and includes the sole right the services provided by ISPs were unlike the more pas-
(a) to produce, reproduce, perform or publish any sive physical facilities provided by traditional carriers, it
translation of the work, held that the ‘‘means of communication’’ must be inter-
(b) in the case of any literary, dramatic, musical or preted in an expansive way, capable of including techno-
artistic work, to communicate the work to the logical developments. The Court emphasized that thosepublic by telecommunication
simply providing the means of telecommunication were
and to authorize any such acts. passive participants lacking the practical ability to con-
‘‘Telecommunication’’ is defined broadly to include trol and monitor content. Importantly, the court appreci-
‘‘any transmission of signs, signals, writing, images or ated that it is not currently technologically feasible, or at
sounds or intelligence of any nature by wire, radio, least very expensive and impractical, for ISPs to effec-
visual, optical or other electromagnetic system’’. 31 tively monitor and prevent the transmission of material.
This would, of course, be different when the ISP acts inAt first glance, these provisions would appear to
concert with content providers, and therefore could notcatch ISPs. However, the Copyright Act contains certain
benefit from the exception under those circumstances.exceptions which appear flexible enough to protect
against ISP liability. In particular, ISPs should be able to While most of the core activities of an ISP are savedrely on paragraph 2.4(1)(b): by the common carrier exemption, the majority of the
A person whose only act in respect of the communica- Court concluded that caching was not caught by thetion of a work or other subject-matter to the public consists
exemption. Caching enhances the speed of transmissionof providing the means of telecommunication necessary for
and reduces the cost to the ISP but it is not ‘‘necessary’’another person to so communicate the work or other sub-
ject-matter does not communicate the work or other sub- for communication. Hence, caching was not protected
ject-matter to the public. by the exemption in paragraph 2.4(1)(b), and therefore,
Just as a letter carrier or a telephone company to the extent that copyrighted material was being
would be saved from liability by the operation of para- cached, it would constitute an infringement. Justice






























































A Discussion of ISP Liability 83
the majority had taken too strict an approach to the have benefited from the intermediary exception given
his active involvement in the infringing activity.definition of ‘‘necessary’’ and that the notion of necessity
should include mechanisms for improving the function-
ality of the means of communication.
Public Policy Development 
The other interesting development with respect to The Consultation Paper issued by Industry Canada
ISPs and copyright that arises out of the Tariff 22 case is and Canadian Heritage provides some further indication
SOCAN’s argument that when an ISP simply provides of the way in which the issue of ISP liability for online
customers with an Internet connection, they implicitly copyright infringement may unfold. 36 The paper out-
authorize the communication of material. However, the lines a proposal which would include a limited role for
Court rejected that argument, finding that since the ISP government regulation to establish copyright liability
typically has no contractual or economic relationship rules that are clear and fair. The paper raises the possi-
with a content provider, they merely facilitate, but do bility of establishing a complaints-driven notice and
not authorize, communication. Host servers, which store takedown process similar to the DMCA that would
material rather than transmit it to the end user, are in a address the concerns of both rights-holders and ISPs.
different position, since they do have a contractual rela- Importantly, an ISP that blocks access to an allegedly
tionship with content providers. This arguably increases infringing site in good faith would not be liable for the
the host server’s opportunity to monitor and remove harm suffered in consequence of this action. However,
material. Nonetheless, the Court held that host servers the paper acknowledges the concerns about a notice and
merely facilitate the communication of material by sup- takedown regime, specifically that such a system would
plying equipment that enables others to communicate. represent a considerable overhead expense for ISPs and
Host servers, then, are also passive participants and can that it may discourage ISPs from participating in volun-
not be said to authorize communication. The Court did tary licensing-based initiatives from the online environ-
suggest, however, that a contractual term prohibiting the ment.
posting of infringing material, although not determina- The Canadian Association of Internet Providers
tive, would help make it clear that the operator does not (‘‘CAIP’’), a private organization whose current members
sanction the communication. Finally, the Court found provide more than 85 per cent of the Internet connec-
that implicit authorization may be inferred if host servers tions to Canadian homes, schools, and businesses, has
neglected to remove infringing material once notified of (perhaps not surprisingly) responded to the Consultation
its existence. Paper with comments that argue for greater self-regula-
tion. CAIP dislikes the ‘‘drastic and potentially legallyThe rationale behind the common carrier exemp-
contentious action by an ISP of actively taking targetedtion under the Copyright Act is similar to the innocent
content down without a court order.’’ 37 Instead, it pro-dissemination defence for the common law of defama-
poses a ‘‘Notice and Notice’’ regime where copyrighttion — a person who transmits information without
holders alleging infringement would issue statutory-(ordinarily) having any capacity to control the informa-
defined notice to an ISP and ISPs, in turn, would providetion transmitted ought not to be held civilly liable for
a statutory-defined notice of the allegation to the partysomeone else’s use of their transmission facilities. How-
responsible for the alleged infringement. Should this pro-ever, when the transmitter takes on some other role, they
cess not result in the voluntary removal of the allegedlyare no longer entitled to the benefit of that protection.
infringing content, CAIP argues an ISP should only be
Although there have been no Canadian decisions required to take down the content when served with a
holding an ISP liable for copyright infringement in the court order. According to CAIP, ‘‘requiring ISPs to take
down content based solely on the allegations of a thirdcivil courts, a bulletin board operator was convicted
party, would run counter to the fundamental principlecriminally under the Copyright Act. In R. v. M. (J.P.), 35 the
of Canadian law that someone is innocent until provenaccused was a 17-year-old operator of a computer bul-
guilty’’. 38letin board which allowed users to download copyright
protected software programs. The accused played a very In our view, the real issue behind this debate is the
active role in the infringement, uploading the copy- ‘‘default’’ position and, conversely, who is required to go
righted material, providing access to users, and even sup- to court to preserve their preferred outcome. A notice
plying the software required to copy the programs. The and take-down regime ensures that potentially infringing
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal found that the accused’s materials are immediately removed from the Web site
actions were an infringement of the right of telecommu- (since most ISPs are indifferent as to whether the mate-
nication and further, that in controlling the means and rial stays or is removed, but will remove it to ensure they
manner by which the users of the BBS accessed and suffer no liability). Hence, it is the party who posted the
downloaded the material, the operator was also crimi- allegedly infringing material that will have to seek a
nally liable for ‘‘distributing’’ the infringing material. court order to reinstate it. Conversely, a notice and
Although the Court did not discuss the operation of notice regime, since it does not require the ISP to remove
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copyright owner to seek a court order. If litigation were sibly. We end this paper with some (perhaps obvious)
tips for ISPs that can help them avoid litigation or lia-costless and instantaneous, which regime is selected
bility: 39should not particularly matter. However, since the reality
is quite the opposite, the time and expense of seeking a
● An ISP should ensure that the terms and condi-court order means that the default position will likely tions of its subscription contracts clearly indicate
prevail in the overwhelming number of cases. that users are not to make illegal or civilly
unlawful use of their access.There is no obvious solution to this debate. On the
one hand, we find the ‘‘innocent until proven guilty’’ ● An ISP should institute and implement an
argument in support of notice and notice thoroughly ‘‘Authorized Use’’ policy and such policy should
unpersuasive. The consequences (removal of the include a contact name within the organization
offending materials) are much less than a criminal sanc- for customers who experience problems; the
policy should be communicated to subscriberstion, and copyright owners regularly obtain interlocutory
and the general public, and should be periodi-injunctions merely by demonstrating a prima facie case.
cally reviewed and updated.On the other hand, the notice and take-down regime
effectively reverses the ordinary situation, in which the
● An ISP should implement a ‘‘Privacy Policy’’ thatcopyright holder is required to seek the court’s protec- clearly articulates the extent of the protection
tion by showing there has been a violation of copyright, offered, and not offered, to its subscribers. In
and the alleged infringer is not required to seek the particular, it should not make unqualified
court’s permission by showing there is not. If this is to be promises to its subscribers that their privacy
reversed for the Internet, copyright holders should and/or personal information will be protected
clearly articulate a reason, such as (perhaps) the detri- and/or remain confidential; such terms should
be tempered with words such as ‘‘unless wemental effects that digital technology has had on their
believe it to be required by law’’ or ‘‘subject toability to protect their works.
legal process or compulsion’’.
● An ISP should have a system in place to quickly
remove obscene, infringing or defamatory con-
tent from its servers, and the terms of this regimeConclusion and Pre-Litigation
should be clearly communicated to subscribers.Practice 
● An ISP should consider configuring its network
lthough the legal consequences of owning and to bar access to sites that are known as defama-A operating an ISP have yet to be considered in tory, illegal, obscene or infringing.
Canada, we have the benefit of examining the two con-
trasting approaches to ISP liability taken by the U.S. and ● An ISP should specify the appropriate jurisdic-
tion in the event of a legal dispute.the U.K. When faced with a seemingly novel legal issue,
some jurisdictions (such as the U.S.) respond with an
● An ISP’s user agreement should have a goodarsenal of legislation to combat the problem, while
limitation of liability, that includes the followingothers (such as Canada and the U.K.) tend towards
elements:adapting existing laws. Despite the difference in
approach, however, the end result is surprisingly not that ● a clause that strictly limits liability to a sub-
dissimilar. All three jurisdictions endorse responsible scriber to the cost of the service;
conduct on the part of an ISP and reward this responsi-
● an indemnity obliging the subscriber tobility with limited liability. Although the CDA is a pow-
indemnify the ISP for any content posted;erful shield for ISPs charged with online defamation, an
ISP will also be protected in the U.K. (and likely Canada)
● an arbitration clause to attempt to avoid classif it meets the requirements for innocent dissemination.
proceedings; andLikewise, the notice and takedown provisions of the
DMCA also encourage ISPs to be alert and responsive to ● for ISPs servicing the consumer, a representa-
online infringement. The lesson for ISPs is that the likeli- tion and warranty by the user that the service
hood of liability is significantly reduced if they take some will be used for personal use only, and not for
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